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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1 is the 
leading major growth sector within K–12 education litigation.2  
Among the IDEA’s “extensive procedural requirements,”3 the 
primary adjudicative step is the due process hearing (DPH).4  After 
the DPH, the subsequent steps of the adjudicative avenue under the 
IDEA are (1) if the state chooses to have a second administrative tier, 
a review officer stage,5 and (2) appeal to either a state or federal 
court.6 
Under its model of “cooperative federalism,”7 the IDEA 
legislation8 and regulations9 provide states with the option of 
supplementing its detailed foundation, including additional 
specifications for DPHs.  To fill a gap in the increasingly rich 
literature on various aspects of DPHs, the purpose of this article is to 
provide a systematic synthesis of these state law additions.  Part I of 
the article provides a review of the relevant literature.  Part II 
                                                          
* Perry A. Zirkel is university professor emeritus of education and law at 
Lehigh University. He has a Ph.D. in Education Administration, a J.D. from the 
University of Connecticut, and an L.L.M. from Yale. 
1 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400.1 et seq. (2016). 
2 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The "Explosion" in Education 
Litigation: An Updated Analysis, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011) (revealing the 
upward trajectory of IDEA litigation within the relatively level trend of K–12 
litigation within the past three decades). 
3 E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 182 (1982); see also Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 
RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (referring to the IDEA’s “detailed set of 
procedures”); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 68 (2005) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (characterizing the Act as having a “detailed procedural scheme”). 
4 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2016).  The full designation is “impartial due process 
hearing,” although the Act alternatively refers to “due process hearing” as a shorter, 
more general designation.  E.g., id. §§ 1415(b)(7)(B), 1415(e)(2)(E)–(G), 
1415(f)(1)(B)(ii), 1415(f)(3)(B).  
5 Id. § 1415(g). 
6 Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
7 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. at 52 (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 
183 F.3d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
8 See supra note 1. 
9 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. (2018). 
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tabulates the DPH requirements in the IDEA legislation and 
regulations.  Part III sets forth the method and results of the 
canvassing of state laws.  Finally, Part IV provides a discussion of 
the results along with recommendations for further research. 
 
II.  LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
The relevant secondary sources tend to fit in two not entirely 
separate groups, roughly designated as narrative rhetoric and 
empirical research.  Much of the first group of courses has focused 
on problems with DPHs,10 including expense to the parties,11 damage 
to their relationship,12 and lengthy complexity of the process,13 and 
suggested solutions, such as individualized education program (IEP) 
facilitation14 and binding arbitration.15  The empirical research, as 
reviewed more extensively elsewhere, includes analyses of frequency 
                                                          
10 For the obverse side, see, e.g., Mark C. Weber, In Defense of IDEA Due 
Process, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 495 (2014) (concluding that the DPH 
mechanism should be subject to refinement, not removal). 
11 E.g., Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin, & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How IDEA 
Fails Families without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of 
Special Education Lawyering, 10 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 111–14 (2011) 
(identifying prevailing problems and possible solutions for parents in poverty). 
12 E.g., AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS, RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE 
PROCESS 8–9 (2013), https://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_Advocacy/ 
Public_Policy_Resources/Special_Education/AASARethinkingSpecialEdDueProce
ss.pdf (citing various sources that identify parties’ perceived dissatisfaction). 
13 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions for the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 55 MONT. L. REV. 403, 405 (1994) (identifying the 
cumbersome length of DPHs as one of the prevailing problems). 
14 E.g., Tracy G. Muller, IEP Facilitation: A Promising Approach for 
Resolving Conflicts Between Families and Schools, 41 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL 
CHILD. 60 (Jan. 2009) (describing a process that utilizes an outside facilitator for 
resolving disagreements at IEP meetings); Elizabeth A. Shaver, Every Day Counts: 
Proposals to Reform IDEA’s Due Process Structure, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143 
(2015) (recommending, inter alia, IEP facilitation in lieu of the current pre-DPH 
resolution session procedure). 
15 E.g., S. James Rosenfeld, It's Time for an Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Procedure, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 544 (2012) (providing for an 
additional dispute resolution option for binding arbitration by a panel consisting of 
an expert in the child's disability, a special education administrator with experience 
in the child's disability, and an attorney familiar with special education law). 
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and outcomes of DPHs decisions.16  In the overlapping margin, 
systematic syntheses examine specialized aspects of DPHs, including 
burden of proof,17 impartiality,18 and remedial authority.19    
More proximate to the present focus, a few analyses have 
examined state law additions to the IDEA foundation for specific 
areas, such as and identification of students with specific learning 
disabilities,20 behavior-related strategies in special education,21 and 
                                                          
16 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy A. Skidmore, National Trends in the 
Frequency and Outcomes of Hearing and Review Officers under the IDEA: An 
Empirical Analysis, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 525 (2015) (providing 
comprehensive literature review and systematic findings specific to frequency and 
outcomes of DPH decisions).  For more recent frequency or outcomes analyses for 
specific issues, see, e.g., Cathy A. Skidmore & Perry A. Zirkel, Has the Supreme 
Court’s Schaffer Decision Placed a Burden on Hearing Officer Decision-Making 
under the IDEA, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 304 (2015) (finding that 
Schaffer v. Weast has had a minor effect on DPH decisions); Perry A. Zirkel, 
Manifestation Determinations under IDEA 2004; An Updated Legal Analysis, 29 J. 
SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 32 (2016) (finding similar frequency and outcome 
pattern after, as compared with before, 2004 IDEA amendments); Perry A. Zirkel, 
Are the Outcomes of Hearing (and Review) Officer Decisions Different for Pro Se 
and Represented Parents?, 34 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 263 (2015) 
(finding a significant difference but questioning causality); Perry A. Zirkel, 
Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE under the IDEA, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214 (2013) (determining frequency and outcomes of 
compensatory education and tuition reimbursement).  
17 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Who Has the Burden of Persuasion in Impartial 
Hearings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?, 13 CONN. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 1 (2013) (categorizing state laws into the three groupings after Schaffer v. 
Weast – silent, default, on-district). 
18 E.g., Peter J. Maher & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality of Hearing and Review 
Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 83 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 109 
(2007) (providing a checklist of hearing officer characteristics and conduct that 
courts have determined to be either a clear, probably, unlikely, or not at all a 
violation of the IDEA impartiality requirement). 
19 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review 
Officers under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2011) (canvassing the case law and related 
authority for the various remedies available to IDEA hearing and review officers). 
20 E.g., Laura Boynton Hauerwas, Rachel Brown & Amy N. Scott, Specific 
Learning Disability and Response to Intervention: State-Level Guidance, 80 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 101 (2013); Perry A. Zirkel & Lisa B. Thomas, State Laws 
and Guidelines for Implementing RTI, 43 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 60 
(Sept./Oct. 2010) (tracking states’ official responses to the IDEA 2004 provision 
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the statute of limitations for DPHs.22 Most closely, a state-by-state 
canvassing of various features of DPH systems serves as the direct 
springboard for the present state law tabulation.23  This springboard 
analysis, which was based on a survey of the responsible 
representatives of state education agencies (SEAs),24 revealed an 
overall trend toward “judicialization” of DPHs, including the 
increasing use of full-time administrative law judges (ALJs) as 
hearing officers.25  However, it did not extend to examining the 
applicable state laws for DPHs that added to the applicable IDEA 
requirements. 
 
III.  IDEA FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
The IDEA contains specific provisions for the successive phases 
before, during, and after DPHs.  The “before” and “after” phases 
serve only as the frames for the focus of the present analysis.26  The 
                                                          
for changing the requirements for eligibility under the classification of specific 
learning disabilities).   
21 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, State Special Education Laws for Functional 
Behavioral Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Update, 45 
COMMUNIQUÉ 4 (Nov. 2016) (finding continuing pattern of skeletal additions to 
IDEA for functional behavioral assessments and behavior intervention plans). 
22 Perry A. Zirkel & Peter J. Maher, The Statute of Limitations under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 175 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2003) 
(categorizing states into various identified groupings prior to the express filing 
limitation in the 2004 amendments of the IDEA). 
23 Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems under the 
IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2010).  An update 
of this survey analysis is in progress.  Jennifer Collins, Thomas Mayes, & Perry A. 
Zirkel, State Due Process Hearing Systems: An Update, J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 
(under review). 
24 The respondents were either the SEA special education directors or, via their 
delegation, their particular staff member who supervised the DPH system.  Id. at 4. 
25 Id. at 7.  For the use of this term to refer to the trend toward legal procedures 
rather than special education expertise, see Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, & 
Anastasia D'Angelo, Creeping Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An 
Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007) (finding 
gradual increase in various indicators of this trend in DPHs in Iowa). 
26 Due to the marginal significance of the prehearing and posthearing phases 
here, their illustrative citations are limited to the IDEA legislation.  For the 
corresponding regulations, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506 – 300.510 (2018) (prehearing) 
and §§ 300.513 – 300.514, 300.516 (2018) (posthearing).  The regulations largely 
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provisions for the prehearing phase address (1) the complaint,27 (2) 
the response,28 (3) the resolution session,29 (4) prehearing 
disclosure,30 and (5) the opportunity for mediation.31  Although the 
dividing line is not a bright one, the hearing officer (HO) is—with 
very limited exception32—not directly involved in these enumerated 
prehearing steps.  The provisions for the post-hearing phase address 
(1) the decision33 and (2) any appeal.34 
Specifically, the focus here is the DPH rather than the prehearing 
and posthearing phases.  Although not devoid of overlap with or 
extension into the pre- and post-hearing periods,35 the following 
provisions of the IDEA legislation, with the limited supplementation 
of its regulations,36 set forth the outer boundaries and four-category 
organization of the analysis37: 
                                                          
repeat the statutory provisions, providing relatively limited added specifications.  
E.g., id. § 300.512(a)(3) (2018) (five-day minimum for “any evidence,” not just 
evaluations and their recommendations). 
27 E.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6) (2016) (subject matter and statute of 
limitations) and 1415(b)(7)(A) (2016) (contents).  The related provisions also limit 
the amendment of the complaint.  Id. § 1415(c)(2)(E)(i) (2016).    
28 Id. § 1415(c)(2)(B) (2016). 
29 Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(1) (2016). 
30 Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(2) (2016).  For the notable extension of the scope of this 
five-day requirement in the regulations, see supra note 26. 
31 Id. § 1415(e) (2016).  However, extending beyond the immediate prehearing 
phase, this opportunity extends to the period before the complaint.  Id. §1415(e)(1) 
(2016). 
32 This exception is for the possible resort to the hearing officer for a 
determination of the sufficiency of the complaint.  Id. § 1415(c)(2)(D) (2016). 
33 Id. §§ 1415(f)(3)(E) (free appropriate public education boundaries for the 
decision) and 1415(i)(1)(A) (2016) (finality of the decision).  The corollary 
regulations add only a requirement for “findings of fact” although oddly via “and” 
rather than “in” the decision.  E.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a)(5) (2018). 
34 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(g) (review officer) and 1415(i)(2)–(3) (2016) (court, 
including attorneys’ fees). 
35 A major example is the category of “HO features,” with the subcategories of 
qualifications and impartiality being initially and largely a prehearing matter but 
continuing in the implementation phase, including disqualifications during and 
after the DPH. 
36 The citations of the regulations are limited to those that provide 
specifications beyond those of the legislation. 
37 The bulleted items only exemplify rather than exhaust the subcategories.  
For example, the IDEA does not address training or assignment of HOs; yet these 
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1.    HO Features 
       • Impartiality: not an SEA or district employee38 and without  
          conflict of interest39 
       • Qualifications40: applicable law,41 hearing management,42  
          and decision writing43 
2.    Party rights 
       • Representation44 
       • Witnesses45 
       • Hearing record46 
                                                          
items emerge as additional subcategories under the broad HO Features category to 
the extent that state laws address them.  Moreover, the four categories and their 
subcategories are neither mutually exclusive nor clearly settled.  For example, the 
Evidence subcategory under HO Authority overlaps with the Witnesses 
subcategory of Party Rights.  Similarly, the single IDEA items respectively used as 
placeholders for the HO Authority category (infra text accompanying note 48) and 
the Miscellaneous category (infra text accompanying note 51) are merely tentative 
interpretations in light of the lack of a pre-established taxonomy for this state law 
analysis. 
38 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i) (2016) (“an employee of the SEA or the LEA 
that is involved in the education or care of the child”).  The regulations add the 
clarification that “[a] person who otherwise qualifies to conduct a hearing . . . is not 
an employee of the agency solely because he or she is paid by the agency to serve 
as a hearing officer.”  34 C.F.R. § 300.511(c)(2) (2018). 
39 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i) (2016) (“a personal or professional interest that 
conflicts with the person’s objectivity in the hearing”). 
40 The regulations add a requirement for the applicable education agency to 
maintain a list of the HOs that includes their qualifications.  34 C.F.R. § 
300.511(c)(3) (2018). 
41 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(ii) (2016) (“knowledge of, and the ability to 
understand, the provisions of the Act, Federal and State regulations pertaining to 
the Act, and legal interpretations of the Act by Federal and State courts”). 
42 Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(iii) (2016) (“knowledge and ability to conduct hearings 
in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice”). 
43 Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(iv) (2016) (“knowledge and ability to render and write 
decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice”). 
44 Id. § 1415(h)(1) (2016) (“the right to be accompanied and advised by 
counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the 
problems of children with disabilities”). 
45 Id. § 1415(h)(2) (2016) (“the right to present evidence and confront, cross-
examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses”). 
46 Id. § 1415(h)(3) (2016) (“the right to written, or, at the option of the parents, 
electronic findings of fact and decisions”).  The regulations add that this record 
must be “at no cost to parents.”  34 C.F.R. § 300.512(c) (2018). 
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       • Parent options for open hearing and child’s attendance47 
3.    HO Authority 
       • Evidence, including limitation on added issues48 
4.    Timelines 
       • Statute of limitations (SOL), or filing deadline for DPH49 
       • Extensions50 
                • Miscellaneous51 
 
IV.  METHOD AND RESULTS 
 
The search for relevant state law consisted of three successive 
sources.  The primary source was the Westlaw database, using the 
separate compilations of statutes and regulations on a state-by-state 
basis to obtain pertinent provisions in the state law corollaries to the 
IDEA.52  For the relatively few states where the available entries 
mentioned or implied a relevant policy manual, the next source was 
                                                          
47 34 C.F.R. §300.512(c) (2018) (“Parents involved in hearings must be given 
the right to—(1) Have the child who is the subject of the hearing present; (2) Open 
the hearing to the public.”). 
48 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B) (2016) (“The party requesting the due process 
hearing shall not be allowed to raise issues at the due process hearing that were not 
raised in the [complaint], unless the other party agrees otherwise.”).  This 
provision, although a limitation on the overlapping category of Party Rights, serves 
as a placeholder here for HO Authority based on the HOs enforcement obligation 
and its similarly direct connection to the residual and central Evidence subcategory. 
49 Id. §§ 1415(b)(6)(b) and 1415(f)(3)(C)-(D) (2016) (filing within two years 
of the “knew or should have known” (KOSHK) date unless state law specifies 
otherwise, with two express exceptions). 
50 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2018) (granting the HO authority to “grant specific 
extensions of time beyond the [applicable 45-day period for the decision] at the 
request of either party”). 
51 Serving as the basis for this residual catchall category is the reference in the 
regulations to HO-initiated evaluations.  34 C.F.R. § 300.502(d) (2018).     
52 The primary strategy was to search within “education,” but more extensive 
ad hoc efforts were warranted in several states due to not only varying terms for 
education but also reasonable indication of the additional applicability of more 
generic legislation or regulations for administrative hearings.  E.g., the Arizona and 
Colorado special education regulations: ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R7-2-405 (2015) 
(defining the HO as “an administrative law judge (‘ALJ’) of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings”); COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8(7.5)(f) (2016) (referring to 
HOs as ALJs of the Office of Administrative Courts). 
    
Spring 2018       State Laws for Due Process Hearings Under the IDEA 11 
the website of the SEA for the cited document.53  Finally, for the 
states with such policy manuals and for those in which either the 
legal status of the policy manual or the applicability of the state 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provisions for contested cases 
was unclear,54 the final source was e-mail communications with the 
state representative responsible for IDEA DPHs.55 
In light of the partially blurry margins, the final scope of sources 
was limited to state special education laws, state APA provisions to 
the extent applicable, and legally binding state policy manuals as of 
December 2017,56 thus excluding DPH-related manuals that provided 
                                                          
53 IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.004 (2018) (incorporating by reference the 
Idaho Special Education Manual, which is available at 
http://www.sde.idaho.gov/topics/admin-rules/files/sped-
manual/documents/Special-Education-Manual-Approved-081017.pdf); S.C. CODE 
ANN. REGS. 43-243(II) (2016) (referencing the SEA’s policies, which are available 
at https://ed.sc.gov/districts-schools/special-education-services/fiscal-and-grants-
management-fgm/grants/sc-policies-and-procedures-for-special-education/); W. 
VA. CODE R. § 126-16-3 (2017) (incorporating by reference the “West Virginia 
Procedures Manual for the Education of Students with Exceptionalities,” which is 
available at http://wvde.state.wv.us/osp/Policy2419_2017.pdf); 7 WYO. CODE R. § 
7 (2018) (requiring the SEA to adopt “dispute resolution policies and/or 
procedures,” which is available at https://edu.wyoming.gov/downloads/special-
ed/SpecEd_Policy_and_Procedure_Manual_v__1_1FINAL_8-20-2010.pdf). 
54 First, quaere whether such policy manuals comply with the IDEA regulation 
requiring an APA-type process for policies and procedures that implement the 
IDEA.  34 C.F.R. § 300.165 (2018).  Second, in addition to the states that use full-
time governmental ALJs as IDEA HOs, some others (e.g., Indiana and Kentucky) 
apply their APA.  Conversely and unusually, Wisconsin uses full-time ALJs but 
expressly excludes applicability of its APA.  WIS. STAT. § 115.80(10) (2017).  
55 E.g., E-mail from Sheila Patsel, Assistant Director of Office of Federal 
Programs for W.V. Dep’t of Educ., to Perry A. Zirkel (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:57 EST) 
(rules of procedure for state superintendent hearings and appeals do not apply to 
IDEA DPHs in W. Va.) (on file with author); E-mail from Carol Ann Hudgens, 
Section Chief for Policy for Exceptional Children Division of N.C. Dep’t of Pub. 
Instruction, to Perry A. Zirkel (Nov. 30, 2017 11:08 EST) (clarifying that the state 
APA applies to IDEA DPHs in N.C.); E-mail from Tammy Pust, Chief Judge, 
Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings, to Perry A. Zirkel (Nov. 20, 2017, 17:06 CST) 
(same for Minn.) (on file with author); E-mail from Kerry V. Smith, Director of 
Pennsylvania’s Office for Dispute Resolution, to Perry A. Zirkel (Nov. 28, 2017, 
10:30 EST) (acknowledging that the issue is unsettled but opining that the state 
APA is probably not binding on DPHs in Pa.) (on file with author). 
56 See supra note 53.  For a close call in favor of inclusion, see HEARING 
RULES FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS (2008), 
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guidance for HOs and/or the public without the force of law.57  The 
Appendix lists the citations of the state law, including the binding 
manuals, in two columns, differentiating those state law specific to 
special education from the generic APA provisions applicable to 
IDEA HOs.58 
Similarly, the subject matter scope extends to the 
aforementioned59 four categories of the DPH process, with the 
understanding that the separation from the excluded prehearing and 
posthearing stages,60 like those among these four categories,61 is not 
                                                          
www.mass.gov/anf/docs/dala/bsea/hearing-rules.doc; the basis for this 
determination is MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71B, § 2A(a) (2017) (authorizing the 
director of the HOs unit, with specified consultation, to issue necessary procedural 
rules consistent with applicable law). 
57 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 3091 (2018) (providing for “guidance” manual for 
interested parties); PENNSYLVANIA SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MANUAL 1 (2017), http://odr-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Dispute-Resolution-
Manual.pdf (specifying that the document lacks the force of law); HEARING 
OFFICER DESKBOOK: A REFERENCE FOR VIRGINIA HEARING OFFICERS 1 (2016) 
(“These guidelines create no legal mandates or requirements”).  For a close call in 
favor of exclusion, see POLICIES GOVERNING SERVICES FOR STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES (2014), https://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/policies/nc-policies-
governing-services-for-children-with-disabilities/policies-children-disabilities.pdf.  
See supra note 55.  However, this conclusion is only tentative in light of North 
Carolina State Board of Education v. North Carolina Rules Review Commission, 
805 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that the state board of education 
policies are governed by the rulemaking requirement of the APA, including the 
Rules Review Commission’s approval).  Similarly, the scope does not extend to 
attorney general opinions concerning DPHs.  E.g., Cal. Attorney Gen. Opinion No. 
14-1401 (Sept. 28, 2017) (opining that neither the IDEA and corollary California 
laws nor the California APA authorizes non-attorney representation at a DPH). 
58 For the states that apply APA laws, the citations are to the regulations rather 
than the legislation for the sake of specificity and brevity. 
59 See supra notes 38–51 and accompanying text. 
60 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
61 The reasons for the incomplete clarity and consistency include (1) although 
the pertinent IDEA and state law provisions generally use some of these organizing 
categories, such as hearing rights, they are far from complete and symmetrical in 
the use of these headings; (2) some of the headings inevitably overlap, such as 
those attributed to the parties and those attributed to the HO; and (3) variance in the 
strength and detail of the entries would otherwise cause undue complications and 
questions, such as a mandatory provision for prehearing conferences or subpoenas 
otherwise shifted from HO Authority to Party Rights. 
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entirely clear and consistent.62  The reason for the extensions is that 
although the actual DPH is the focus of the analysis, the 
supplementary selection criterion was significance to DPH 
participants, including HOs, and policymakers.63  Conversely, the 
contents do not extend to other, more clearly distinguishable related 
areas.64 
Based on an examination of the aforementioned65 sources in light 
of the organizing focus and supplemental consideration, the author 
developed the subcategories and compiled the entries for the 
accompanying Table.  In comparison to the foundational IDEA 
template, which fit on a tandem basis only to the extent of state law 
entries, the additional subcategories are as follows: (1) for HO 
Features – assignment and training; (2) for Party Rights66 – strike 
                                                          
62 At the outer boundary, an example is the SOL for DPHs, which is at least 
partly a prehearing subject.  See supra note 27.  Yet, as reflected in its overlapping 
specification in the IDEA provisions for the DPH process (supra note 48), this 
SOL is also significant for the conduct of DPHs for at least two reasons.  First, it 
requires difficult HO determinations, including but not at all limited to the KOSHK 
date, which is when the parent first knew or should have known of the alleged 
violative action.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Of Mouseholes and Elephants: The 
Statute of Limitations for Impartial Hearings Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 305 (2016).  
Second, the SOL for DPHs affects the scope of the evidence, at least in separating 
controlling from background information.  See, e.g., Pangerl v. Peoria Unified Sch. 
Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 36 (D. Ariz. 2016); Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw. v. E.B., 45 
IDELR ¶ 249 (D. Haw. 2006) (ruling that the amount of evidence beyond the 
applicable SOL is within the HO’s discretion). 
63 Based on this supplementary criterion, the exceptions to the strict scope for 
the contents were largely extensions into the prehearing stage.  See supra note 62 
and infra text accompanying note 68.  
64 These specific exclusions are: (1) the subject matter jurisdictions for DPHs, 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2016); (2) the “stay-put” provision, id. § 1415(j); 34 
C.F.R. § 300.518 (2018); and (3) the special stay-put and HO provisions, including 
expedited hearings, for disciplinary changes in placement, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4); 
34 C.F.R. § 300.532 (2018).  The other provisions mentioning HOs are part of the 
aforementioned posthearing exclusion for decisions (supra note 33)—specifically 
for attorneys’ fees, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(iii), and tuition reimbursement 
decisions, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2016). 
65 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
66 In partial contrast, the heading for lay representation is a specific application 
of the broader advisor regulation (supra note 44). 
14 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 38-1 
HO67 and discovery; (3) HO authority – prehearing conference and 
subpoenas; and (4) for Timelines – none.68  The entries represent four 
approximate, Likert-type levels: (x) = partial; x = w/o particular 
limitation or detail; X = relatively detailed or forceful; and X = 
unusual.  The Comments column provides clarifying and 
supplementary information with cross-reference to the letter of the 
applicable subcategory.  For the same of efficient use of space, the 
source citations appear in the Appendix. 
Table 1: State Law Additions to IDEA Provisions for DPHs 
Misc. Comments
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AL x x x X
C-rotational; H-mandatory; L-notice only (to SEA); M-
detailed specs (e.g., ct. reporter, sequence)+party 
cooperation
AK x x x x (x) x X X x
A-no emp. within 12 mos.; C-random; D-incl. sp. ed. 
law; E-1 str.; H-HO “may”; J-broad; K-1 yr.; [M-may 
consolidate §504]
AZ* x x X x (x) x
A-no rep. within 12 mos.; H-detailed; L-factors only;
M-APA, incl. ex parte for parties
AR x (x) X x X X
A-ex parte; H-party may request; I-detailed. HO 
determines B/P; J-restrict Ws; L-combo; M-mandatory 
dismissals, no depos or interrogatories, time limits for 
arguments, 3-day general limit
CA* x X X (x) x x X X
A-ex parte; D-80 hrs./20 hrs.; E1 str.+disclosure--> 
recusal; H-party may request;  J-broad+tech.+HO prior 
Qs & experts; M-adv. comm., HO auth. reasonable 
length  [+ prevailing party by issue reg.-required 
handbook and ADR material] + APA, incl. sanctions
[+ A.G. Opinion against lay representation]
CO* X x x x X X
A-jud. std., ex parte+; G thru J-RCP & R.Evid. “to the 
extent practicable”; L-combo=documented+ cause; M-
APA, incl. default, ex parte-parties 
CT x X X X X
D-in procedures and sp ed; H-mandatory with specs.; J-
exhibit numbering+B/Per for IEP on LEA+ 
summon/question Ws; L-detailed+new date; M-HO 
auth. for expert IEP prescription, bifurcation for TR,
and determining hearing length w. factors and briefs 
max., ADR (advisory opinion, visiting atty.)
DE X X x x X A-tripartite panel; C-rotation; J-B/P on LEA
FL* (x) x x x x X X
F-formal HO determination; H-HO "may"; I-not 
documents alone?; L-and 5 days prior; M-APA,  incl. 
stds. of conduct for party reps 
GA* X (x) (x) X X X x
A-not previously familiar+disclosure+ex parte; G,H- 
HO discretion; L-good cause+new date; J-shiftable 
B/P; M-APA, incl. dismissal to re-file
HO Features Party Rights HO Authority Timelines
67 This abbreviated designation represents the analog to peremptory challenges 
in jury selection.  For states with an entry, the Comments column provides the 
specified number of strikes that the law permits. 
68 All of these additions were, at least partly, extensions into the prehearing 
stage.    
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HI* X x x x X x
A-ex parte+familial; H-mandatory; J-HO may restrict 
testimony; L-rigorous reasons exceeding APA; M-APA
ID* x (x) x x
A-ex parte; H-HO "may"; L-documented only; M-
simplified state APA incl. respectful/no smoking
IL X X X x X x X
A-incl. resident and post $; B-ed+exp+screen. 
comm.+eval. for annual reapp.+termination; D-
detailed, contractor; E-1 str.; H-mandatory w. specs; L-
if jt.; M-site, length (7–30 days), system eval.
IN* x (x) x x x x x x x
A-ex parte=business dealings; D-state law procedures 
only; I-broad; L-document only; M-APA, incl. 
sanctions, no class actions (individuals only)
IA* X x (x) X x x X
A-jud. std.+ex parte (w. sanctions)+spouse; H-may; I-
by CSSO+by HO (detailed), R.Evid.; L-factors only; M-
APA, incl. 3
rd
 party, rt. for written briefs
KS* X x X (x) x
B:atty.+exam; E-parent unrestricted (triggering SBE 
appointment);  H-HO auth. or party agreement
KY* x X (x) x (x) X x
A-ex parte; D-max. hrs. (18/6); H-HO “may”; I-unclear 
B/P; K-3 yrs. w. revised exc.; M-biannual report, 
disqualif. by agency head, HO default auth.,
LA* X x x x X X X X
A-rep. within 3 yrs.; B-atty.; H-mandatory/detailed; 
K-1 yr.; M-party dress in "proper business attire," HO 
auth. for telephone hearings
ME X x x I-by CSSO w. HO modif. auth.; J-broad
MD* X (x) (x) X x X X
A-jud. std.; G-documents/objects only; H-HO “may” 
but with specs; J-broad w. auth. to limit; M-HO-
ordered expert W at SEA expense, technology + APA
MA* x x x x (x) X X X
A-ex parte; B-atty.; H-HO “may” but detailed; I-
detailed;  J-broad; M-special bureau-detailed rules 
(e.g., adv. comm., reg. reports, ADR-advisory 
opinions), [jurisd for 504 & parent rejections, 
enforcement, not eval. consent] 
MI* x x (x) x x X x
A-previous law associate; D-“as needed” in specified 
subjects; H-HO “may” but detailed; M-APA, incl. HO 
auth. for issue ID/simplification, technology, reasonable
limits, and no discovery
MN* X x x X x x X x
A-various; H-mandatory/detailed; J-question Ws; L-
good cause examples; M-ADR-FIEP, system data incl. 
participant eval.; mandatory for length; 5-day exc. for 
impeachment+APA
MS (leg. and regs do not make notable additions)
MO X X
A-work or advocacy for 5 yrs.; D-10 hrs. initially and 5 
hrs. annually for the at least 3 designated ALJs
MT x X x x X x
A-ex parte; C-ranking procedure; H-mandatory; J-
R.Evid. w. ltd. exc.; M-“informal disposition,” CSSO 
decision for disqualif.
NE x X x X X x
A-ex parte; G-HO auth.; H-hybrid, detailed; J-party 
option/expense of R.Evid.; L-good cause examples; M-
technology, HO-initiated evid.
NV x X X (x) x
C-random; D-40 hrs. yr. 1, annually thereafter; E-up to 
2 strikes for complainant from panel of 3 (via 
preferential sequence); I-SEA sup’t. auth. and specified 
ct. enforcement; J-B/P on LEA
NH x x K-90 days for TR
NJ* x x (x) X X x X
A-ex parte; G-depos only for good cause; H-mandatory 
w. specs; J-broad w. B/P on LEA; M-“emergent relief”
(~TRO), sanctions+ APA
NM X X
H-mandatory w. specs; M-consideration of costs and 
burdens, sanctions, prohib. non-atty. rep., jt. ext. for 
ADR option, FIEP, untimely withdrawal
NY X X x (x) X X X
A-not atty. within past 2 yrs.; C-rotation; H-HO "may"' 
J- B/P on LEA; L-30-day max. each & factors & 
nonreasons; M-suspension/revocation, max. rates, 
limitation on assisting pro se P, various limits, incl. 1 
day per party 
NC* x (x) X x X X x
K-1 yr.; H-discretionary but detailed; L-examples; M-
APA, incl. sanctions, prohibits non-atty. rep.
ND* x x (x) X x X x
A-ex parte; H-discretionary but detailed; M-FIEP, 
APA
OH x x x B-atty.
OK (x) x x B-atty. or master’s degree; C-rotation
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OR* (x) (x) (x) X x X
A-ex parte (from parties)-only rebuttal/record; G-HO 
auth.; H-discretionary but detailed; M-APA, incl. 
mandatory default for LEA
PA x x
J-incl. HO initiated; M-annual report to SBE. [internal 
manual w/o force of law]
RI (state regs mirror the IDEA regs)
SC (x) (x) x X B-h.s. grad; D-for selection; L-incl. new date
SD* x (x) x X x
A-ex parte; G-HO auth.; J-judicial R.Evid.; M-APA 
(sp. ed. regs merely track IDEA)
TN* x x (x) (x) X x X x
A-ex parte; D-annual trg. (sp.ed.law); F-unless prohib. 
by law; G-ltd.; I-at party request; L-for mediation or 
HO extraord. circ.; M-[prevailing party by issue]+APA, 
incl. technology
TX X X (x) x X X X X
C-rotation; F-formal specs. & HO det.; G-HO auth.; J- 
R.Evid.; J-1 yr.; L-factors+new date; M-sanctions, rep. 
requirements if hearing at a school, party conduct, 
reasonable time limits
UT x C-rotation [otherwise, state rules mirror IDEA regs] 
VT x X x x X X
B-atty; H-mandatory w. specs.; K-90 days for TR; L-
specified reasons; M-withdrawal, 1-day each unless HO 
determines more
VA* x x x x x x (x) X x
A-ex parte; B-atty. (5 yrs.), annual recertif.-eval. 
factors; C-reg’l rotation; H-hybrid, detailed; L-incl. HO-
initiated if SEA approves; M-reissue corrected 
decisions (but not errors of law)  [+deskbook]
WA* (x) X X X
H-HO “may” but detailed; I-detailed via cross ref.;  L-
incl. IHO-initiated; M-IHO auth. for s.j.+ other activism
WV x x x x
(x)
X x
A-not LEA or parent atty. within 1 yr.; B-atty.; C-
rotation; F-delegated to state law (guidance that silence
suffices); M-FIEP, “efficient manner”
WI x x (x) x x X x X
A-atty.; K-1 yr.; H-discretionary; L-document reason;
M-excludes APA 
WY x x (x) X x x
A-ex parte; B-atty.; G-HO “may”; H-mandatory w. 
specs; L-document new date
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*Designates states that have applicable state APA provisions, as cited in the Appendix.
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A.  HO Features  
 
The most frequent state law additions to the foregoing IDEA 
provisions for this category,69 without weighting for partial or 
elaborated entries, were for the impartiality (n=30) and training 
(n=21) subcategories.  For impartiality, as the entries in the 
Comments column show, the prevalent addition was for ex parte 
communications, although some states variously extended the IDEA 
employment/interest prohibitions70 to varying roles and relationships, 
typically for specified periods.  The unusual impartiality provisions 
were the few state laws (Colorado, Iowa, and Maryland) that applied 
the judicial standard, which extends beyond actual to the appearance 
of bias; Illinois’ recusal requirement based on not only residency but 
also if “he or she knows or should know that he or she may receive 
remuneration from a party to the hearing within 3 years following 
[its] conclusion”71; and Delaware’s tripartite panel of a special 
educator, lay advocate, and private attorney.72  
The training requirements were mostly limited to mere mention 
without specified amounts, although California and Missouri were 
the leading examples of explicit minimum amounts for the preservice 
and in-service periods.73  The other unusual provision was the 
elaborate initial and continuing training mechanism in Illinois, which 
not only provides rather detailed specification of the subject matter 
but also “unbiased . . . educational and legal experts” under contract 
with a training entity via “a competitive application process . . . at 
least once every 3 years.”74  
                                                          
69 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
70 See supra notes 38–39. 
71 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(f-5) (2018). 
72 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 926(11.2) (2017).  Akin to the tripartite 
arrangement typical for labor arbitration the collective bargaining agreement 
impasses, the impartiality is inferably based on not only the balance between the 
two polar partisan members but also the neutral, who in this case is the private 
attorney (presumably not working on behalf of either school districts or parents of 
students with disabilities). 
73 Conversely, Kentucky law specifies a maximum of “eighteen (18) classroom 
hours of initial training and six (6) classroom hours per year of continuing 
training.”  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.030(b)(4) (2017). 
74 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02c(e)–(f) (2018).  Moreover, the same 
legislation provides that a specified “7-member Screening Committee shall 
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Beyond the triad of ability and knowledge IDEA competencies,75 
the relatively infrequent state law additions to the Qualifications 
subcategory (n=11) were typically limited to requiring attorney 
status, although a couple of state laws specified a broader educational 
alternative.76  Additionally, three state laws are relatively unusual in 
providing more rigorous requirements: (1) Kansas requires not only 
attorney status but also passing “a written examination prescribed by 
the state board [of education] concerning special education laws and 
regulations”77; Illinois successively requires “a master’s or doctor’s 
degree in education or another field related to disability issues or a 
juris doctor degree”78 and, much more significantly, the 
aforementioned79 rather rigorous specified selection, training, 
evaluation, and reappointment process; and (3) Virginia specifies that 
the attorney must have practiced for five years, show “established 
prior experience with administrative hearings or knowledge of 
administrative law,” 80 and undergo a certification and annual 
recertification process that includes an evaluation based on specified 
factors, such as issuing decisions “within regulatory time frames.”81 
Finally, for the additional subcategory of assignment, the 
similarly infrequent pertinent state law (n=11) provisions almost all 
                                                          
participate in the selection of the training entity” and in not only the initial selection 
but also the annual evaluation and reappointment of the HOs.  Id. 5/14-8.02c(a), 
5/14-8.02c(f), and 5/14-8.02c(g) (2015). 
75 See supra notes 41–43. 
76 Oklahoma provides the alternative of “a Master’s degree in education, 
special education, psychology, or any related field.”  OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 
210:15-13-5(e) (2008).  At the far end, South Carolina requires, as its express 
minimum, “a high school graduate (or … an equivalent credential).”  POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE [IDEA] 10 (2011), 
https://ed.sc.gov/districts-schools/special-education-services/fiscal-and-grants-
management-fgm/grants/sc-policies-and-procedures-for-special-education/.  
Conversely, the many state laws that are silent for this item and for other 
subcategories provide flexibility for de facto requirements as a matter of prevailing 
practice. 
77 KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 91-40-29(b)(1)(B) (2017). 
78 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02c(b) (2018). 
79 See supra note 74. 
80 HEARING OFFICER SYSTEM OF RULES OF ADMINISTRATION 1 (2016), 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/programs/ho/rules_of_admin_1.pdf 
81 8 VA. CODE ADMIN. § 20-81-210(D) (2017). 
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specify a rotational process.  However, at the unusual end, Montana’s 
law provides for a ranking process, whereby the chief state school 
officer (CSSO) submits a list of three HOs to the parties and selects 
one based on their respective rankings.82  Reflecting the overlap with 
the assignment subcategory, the subsequent strike subcategory lists 
Kansas’ variation because it seems, on balance, to be more a matter 
of a party right for peremptory disqualification.83   
 
B.  Party Rights 
 
The most frequent state law addition to the foregoing IDEA 
provisions for this category,84 without weighting for partial or 
elaborate entries, was for discovery (n=19).  However, reflecting the 
overlap between this category and the next one, in various of these 
state laws discovery was subject to the HO’s discretionary authority 
rather than being an unqualified mandate.85  In contrast, the state 
laws entitling parties to lay representation (n=8) and the right for 
peremptory strikes of the assigned HO (n=5) were relatively rare.  
Moreover, as clarified in the Comments column of the Table, the 
right to lay representation sometimes was qualified, such as the 
Florida and Texas provisions for HO determination.86  Finally, the 
right to strike the HO in Kansas was unusual both in terms of breadth 
and ambiguity, giving the parents the right to “request 
                                                          
82 As the intermediate step, the parties have “three business days to rank the 
proposed [HOs] … in order of preference.” MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3509(1)(b) 
(2015).  The predecessor regulation provided for the CSSO’s submission of five 
names for the parties to each eliminate two and rank the remaining three within five 
business days.  E-mail from Mandi Gibbs, Early Assistance Program Director, 
Mont. Office of Pub. Instruction, to Perry A. Zirkel (July 9, 2018, 11:53 EST). 
83 See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
84 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
85 Additionally, the right to discovery had other limitations in some of the state 
laws, as the Comments column entries for Maryland, New Jersey, and Tennessee 
clarified.    
86 The Texas provision is unusual in its specification of a formal procedure, 
including detailed criteria for the HO’s written authorization.  19 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE § 89.1175 (2017). 
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disqualification of any or all of the [HOs] on the list and to request [a 
replacement appointment].”87 
 
C.  HO Authority 
 
For the succeeding and overlapping category of HO Authority, 
the state law additions to the rather minimal pertinent provision in the 
IDEA88 were more frequent—specifically, without weighting as to 
strength or detail, n=40 for subpoenas, n=33 for prehearing 
conferences, and n=28 for various other evidentiary issues.  As for 
variation, the majority of the state law provisions for subpoenas and 
prehearing conferences were discretionary rather than mandatory, 
and an overlapping minority, especially those under APA laws, were 
more detailed.  At the unusual end of the variation range, Iowa’s 
special education law and applicable APA provision differentially 
allocate subpoena authority.89  For evidence, the differences were 
more varied, including provisions for the HO initiating90 or 
limiting,91 testimony.  The relatively unusual provisions include 
requiring (1) formal rules of evidence,92 (2) burden of persuasion on 
                                                          
87 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-973a (2017).  For the specific procedure, including 
timeline, see KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 91-40-28(d)(2)–(4) (2017).  To maintain 
prompt progress in implementing this provision in light of the limited number of 
HOs, the Kansas SEA requests school districts to limit the list for parents to two or 
three hearing officers.  E-mail from Mark Ward, Special Education Attorney, Kan. 
State Dep’t of Educ., to Perry A. Zirkel (Dec. 21, 2017 11:20 EST). 
88 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
89 Compare IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-41.1009(1) (2018) (authorizing chief 
state school officer), with IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 481-10.14 (2018) (authorizing the 
state office of administrative hearings). 
90 Here are examples listed in the Comments column of the table: California 
(asking questions of witnesses before the parties do so and arranging for medical 
experts); Connecticut (summoning and questioning witnesses); Iowa (asking 
clarifying-only questions at the conclusion of the parties questioning of the 
witnesses); Maryland (calling an impartial witness at expense of SEA); and 
Pennsylvania (ordering additional evidence). 
91 E.g., Arkansas (restricting witnesses) and Hawaii (restricting testimony).  
This feature overlaps with the Miscellaneous category item for limiting the DPH 
more generally.  See infra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.  
92 Iowa; South Dakota; and Texas; cf. Colorado (“to the extent practicable”; 
Montana (with limited exceptions); Nebraska (at party option and expense). 
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the school district,93 and, at the extreme end, (3) detailed 
specification for the party exhibits.94 
 
D.  Timelines 
 
The provisions specific to initiating the hearing and extending its 
length are of particular significance to the exercise of HO authority in 
light of the relatively tight and specific timeline for completion of the 
DPH as marked by issuance of the decision.95  For the filing deadline 
(also referred to herein as “SOL”), per the express allowance for state 
exceptions, a few states have shorter period96 and one state has a 
longer period97 than the IDEA two-year, KOSHK-based approach.98  
Beyond this relatively limited group (n=7) of states, the pertinent 
IDEA provisions remain without further specifications. 
For the IDEA provision for HO extensions,99 the state law 
additions were much more frequent (n=31), ranging from limited 
requirements for notice100 to detailed limitations for various 
combinations of reasons, length, and notice.101  At the elaborate end, 
                                                          
93 Delaware, Nevada, New Jersey, and New York; cf. Connecticut (for the 
IEP); Georgia (subject to HO discretion in unusual circumstances).  This 
evidentiary feature fits more closely in the excluded but partially overlapping 
category of HO decisions (supra note 33) but is included here based on its special 
significance. 
94 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-12(d) (2018) (including numbered index, 
specified prefix, chronological sequence, and waiver for good cause). 
95 The IDEA regulations require issuance of the HO’s final decision within 45 
days of completion of the resolution-session phase (supra note 29), except for 
specific extensions that the HO grants at the request of either party (supra note 50). 
96 As indicated in the Comments column of the table, these states fit into two 
subgroups: (1) Alaska, Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin (one 
year); and (2) New Hampshire and Vermont (90 days for tuition reimbursement 
cases).  The triggering dates in Alaska and Wisconsin vary from the IDEA 
“KOSHK” formulation (supra note 49), and in both New Hampshire and Vermont 
the triggering date is the time of the unilateral placement. 
97 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.224(6) (2017) (three years with revised 
exceptions and without limiting the introduction of evidence). 
98 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra note 50. 
100 E.g., Alabama (notice to SEA); Idaho (written decision)   
101 E.g., Alaska (cause and period); Arkansas (all three); Louisiana (cause and 
record); Minnesota (cause, with examples pro and con); and New York (all three). 
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Connecticut has particularly detailed procedures, with factors for and 
exclusions of reasons.102  Other unusual extension provisions include 
Illinois’ preemption of the HO’s discretion “if the parties jointly 
propose a delay in convening the hearing or prehearing 
conference,”103 Virginia’s good cause standard of “the best interest of 
the child,”104 and Washington’s authorization for extensions “by the 
HO upon his or her own motion.”105  
 
E.  Miscellaneous Other 
 
The other state law additions consist of two categories pertinent 
to DPHs—general items that extend across the column headings of 
the Table and specific items that were not in themselves column 
headings.  This catchall status for both general and specific other 
additions is, at least in part, attributable to the table’s rather ad hoc 
formulation at the outset of the data collection.106  
At the general level, on the one extreme that is notable via the 
absence of any column entries, are the two states with laws that do 
not add pertinent provisions to the IDEA requirements: Mississippi 
and Rhode Island.  Conversely, one of the relatively frequent and 
particularly HO-significant general features in several state laws is an 
express authorization for the HO to limit the length of the hearing, 
albeit typically with the counterbalancing qualifier of 
“reasonable.”107  Connecticut’s law goes a step further by specifying 
                                                          
102 E.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-9 (2018). 
103 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.640(b)(1) (2015). 
104 8 VA. CODE ADMIN. § 20-81-210(P)(9) (2017). 
105 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 10-08-090(1) (2017); cf. 8 VA. CODE ADMIN. § 20-
81-210(P)(9)(b) (2017) (upon SEA approval in special circumstances). 
106 The formulation, in turn, was an artifact or consequence of the exploratory 
nature of this tabulation, in light of the absence of a precedent template in the 
literature. 
107 E.g., California, Maryland, Michigan; and Texas; cf. Arkansas (authorizing 
the HO to set limits for the opening and closing arguments); Iowa (requiring the 
HO to set the time limit for argument); Minnesota (requiring the HO to limit the 
length of the DPH to the necessary time for each party’s case).  Minnesota’s special 
education regulations further address this matter be delegating the HO with the 
duty at the prehearing conference to determine the amount of time for the hearing 
based on “balancing the due process rights of the parties with the needs for 
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as examples of this limitation authority the number of witnesses and 
the length of testimony and by specifying the applicable factors as 
“the issues presented and the need to complete the hearing in a timely 
fashion.”108  Representing even more emphasis on timeliness, New 
York and Vermont authorize the HO to limit the DPH to one day for 
each party with largely parallel discretionary exceptions.109  
Similarly, Arkansas adds to the HO’s express authority to limit the 
presentations for expeditiousness the following guidance: “In 
general, a hearing should last no longer than three (3) days.”110  The 
other general feature that appeared to be particularly of interest was 
the relatively frequent provision for alternative dispute resolution 
procedures beyond the IDEA provision for mediation, such as the 
aforementioned111 facilitated IEP process.112 
Miscellaneous other features were at a more specific level, 
amounting to potential additional column headings.  A frequent one 
that the tabulation missed altogether concerned the disqualification of 
HOs.113  Other specific features that, instead, were relatively 
infrequent but noted in the Comments column, included (1) DPH 
system accountability mechanisms, such as advisory committees, 
                                                          
administrative efficiency and limited public resources.”  MINN. R. 
3525.4110(2)(A)(4) (2015). 
108 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-7(c) (2018). 
109 8 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(j)(3)(xiii) (2018) (where the 
HO “determines that additional time is necessary for a full, fair disclosure of the 
facts required to arrive at a decision”); 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 5:2365.1.6.15(e) (2017) 
(where the HO “determines that additional time is necessary for a full, fair 
disclosure of the facts necessary to arrive at a conclusion”).  For another approach 
to a specified limit, see 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(g-55) (2018) (requiring 
“reasonable efforts” for the parties to present their respective cases within seven 
cumulative days and requiring the HO to schedule the final session within thirty 
days for the first session except for “good cause”). 
110 ARK. ADMIN CODE R. § 10.01.32 (2015). 
111 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
112 E.g., Minnesota, North Dakota, and West Virginia.  Connecticut and 
Massachusetts provided for another such alternative—advisory opinions. 
113 Although related to impartiality and the interrelated provisions for 
disclosure, disqualification was unexpected in terms of its significant treatment in 
the relevant state laws.  Another relatively frequent but missed subcategory was the 
HO’s record-keeping responsibility. 
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periodic reports, or evaluation procedures114; (2) occasional 
applicable APA provisions that are not carefully consistent with the 
corresponding provisions in special education laws115 or that warrant 
customization with IDEA DPHs116; (3) the use of technology for 
DPHs117; and (4) the HO authorization for sanctions.118  At the 
unusual end, typically specific to a single state, were Connecticut’s 
provision for bifurcated tuition reimbursement hearings119 and New 
Jersey’s provision for “emergent relief.”120 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
114 E.g., California (advisory committee), Massachusetts (advisory committee 
and regular reports), and Minnesota (system data and participant evaluation).  At 
the extreme, Illinois’ legislation provides an unduly elaborate system, especially for 
a state with a relatively limited number of DPHs, that includes an advisory council, 
a screening committee, a contractual training entity, annual HO evaluations for 
reappointment, and annual system reporting and review.  105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/14-8.02c – 5/14-8.02d (2018). 
115 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
116 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.090(7) (2017): 
 
In all administrative hearings, unless otherwise provided by 
statute or federal law, the party proposing that the agency take 
action or grant a benefit has the burden to show the propriety of 
the agency action or entitlement to the benefit sought.  The 
agency has the burden to show the propriety of . . . the removal 
of a benefit previously granted. 
 
Id. It is not at all clear how this provision squares with (1) the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005), in which the 
Supreme Court not only ruled that the burden of persuasion was on the filing party 
in an IDEA DPH but also declined to address the relationship of state laws that 
provided otherwise, and (2) varying IDEA issues, such as a parental challenge to a 
district’s determination that a child is no longer eligible for an IEP or a district 
filing to obtain consent for evaluating a child for eligibility. 
117 E.g., Maryland, Nebraska, and Tennessee. 
118 E.g., California, New Jersey, and Texas. 
119 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14(b) (2018); cf. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 
1:1-14.6(e) (2018) (providing more general and qualified authority for HO 
bifurcation of the hearing). 
120 N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6A:14-2.7(s) and 1.6A-12.1 (2018). 
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V.  DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The primary conclusion from these findings is that state law 
additions to the IDEA’s foundational requirements for DPHs form a 
pattern characterized by variety and complexity.  The variety fits 
with the value of experimentation among the states as one of the 
potential benefits of federalism.121   
However, the complexity of the present pattern leaves in question 
whether states have realized this benefit.  First, the overlay of the 
more generic provisions of state APAs,122 which in themselves vary 
widely, has in some cases wrought confusion and in others lack of 
customization.123  Second and more significantly, both in the states 
with and in those without applicable APA provisions, the marked 
procedural formalism of peremptory strikes, discovery, and, more 
generally, motion practice signal a possible tipping point in the 
“judicialization” of DPHs.124  The overall trend for special education 
hearings evokes the early warning about the Janus-like tradeoff 
between the benefits of “legalization” and the costs of “the arid 
formality of legalism.”125  This tendency is at marked variance with 
“[t]he legislative history, statutory terms, and regulatory framework 
of the IDEA [that] all emphasize promptness as an indispensable 
                                                          
121 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 783 (2010) (“the values 
of federalism and state experimentation”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 
U.S. 366, 418 (1999) (“‘experimentation’ long thought a strength of our federal 
system”); EEOC v. Wyo., 460 U.S. 226, 264–65 (1983) (“Flexibility for 
experimentation not only permits each state to find the best solutions to its own 
problems, it is the means by which each state may profit from the experiences and 
activities of all the rest.”) (Burger, dissenting).  Justice Brandeis’ dissenting 
opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) is usually 
credited with the conception of states as laboratories. 
122 An overlapping contributing factor is the gradually but significantly 
increased utilization of full-time ALJs.  In 2010, Zirkel & Scala, supra note 23, at 
5, reported that 18 states used full-time ALJs as IDEA HOs, which represented a 
major increase since 1999.  More recently, Colorado, Iowa, and Louisiana have 
joined this group. 
123 See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
125 David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization: The Case of 
Special Education Reconsidered, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 82 (1985). 
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element of the statutory scheme.”126  For example, the Act’s principal 
sponsor of the IDEA emphasized the importance of providing prompt 
DPHs.127  The then simultaneous scholarly cautions about excessive 
formalism128 ring loudly, almost alarmingly, now.129  In the absence 
of federal structural reform,130 the time is ripe for state policymakers 
                                                          
126 E.g., Amann v. Stow, 991 F.2d 929, 932 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Spiegler v. 
District of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Adler v. Educ. Dep’t of State 
of N.Y., 760 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1985); Bow Sch. Dist. v. Quentin W., 750 F. Supp. 
546 (D.N.H. 1990)). 
127 E.g., Blackman v. District of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 71, 80 n.8 (D.D.C. 
2003) (citing Senator Williams’ statement in the final Senate debate ay 121 CONG. 
REC. 37,416 (1975)). 
128 E.g., David Kirp, William Buss, & Peter Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special 
Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 154 
(1974) (providing a qualifying caution about “proceduralization”); Maynard C. 
Reynolds, More Process Than Is Due, 14 THEORY INTO PRAC. 61 (1975) (warning 
that “the very procedures may become so burdensome that they will dull the edge 
and slow the thrust of [effective] implementation”). 
129 For an intervening judicial observation, see Lillbask v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp. 
2d 182, 192 (D. Conn. 2000):  
 
Detailed rules of procedure are no panacea against lengthy, 
contentious, wasteful, divisive, or delay-causing arguments. 
Indeed, highly formalized systems of legal procedure can be 
fodder for delay. Due process is not always served by bringing 
every dispute into a mini-courtroom where only lawyers can 
navigate the myriad rules.  A formalized system could serve to 
disenfranchise and exclude the very people meant to be served, 
namely the parents and the educators.  
Id. 
130 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions for the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, 55 MONT. L. REV. 403 (1994) (recommending a 
five-part dramatic structural reform in the IDEA for DPHs).  Congress is not likely 
to revise the IDEA in the foreseeable future, and the 2004 amendments were 
different in direction and extent from this proposal.  See Zirkel et al., supra note 25, 
at 48 (“[T]he Congressional prescription in the latest amendments to the IDEA, 
particularly the strengthened notice-pleading feature and extended timeline for the 
hearing decision, clearly borrow from, and potentially add to, the judicialization 
trend.  Time will tell whether the new pre-hearing procedures reduce the frequency 
and complexity of cases that go to hearing, but the likely trade-off will be not only 
more technical threshold issues, such as whether the complaint was sufficiently 
specific, but also closer and more complex cases, thus meaning longer duration to 
decision.”).  Indeed, the U.S. Department of Education has failed to reform even 
the underlying information base about the efficacy of the DPH system.  E.g., U.S. 
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as well as IDEA HOs to exert more concerted and customized efforts 
at making DPHs more efficient both for the sake not only of the 
immediate and changing needs of the individual child at issue but 
also the allocation and utilization of school system’s limited 
resources for education.  The requisite efficiency does not mean the 
elimination of these state law additions but rather more careful 
selection and customization.131 
For state policymakers, one of the factors that merit more careful 
consideration for the requisite customization is the state’s level of 
DPH adjudications.  The row-by-row entries in the Table do not 
closely correspond to either the absolute or per-capita calculation of 
the number of such adjudications.  On an absolute basis, for example, 
the relatively small top group, which accounts for most of the 
adjudications, includes New York, California, Pennsylvania, and 
New Jersey; yet, the entries for these states in the Table reveal a wide 
variety in the nature and number of entries.  Similarly, for 
adjudications on a per capita basis, Rhode Island ranked tenth and 
has no entries in the Table, whereas states with a much lower ranking 
(e.g., Iowa - #44, Florida - #38, and Colorado - #29, and Louisiana - 
#26) have rather extensive entries.132  
For HOs, the recommendations are to (1) compare the provisions 
in other state laws to lobby from the ground up for worthwhile 
improvements in the provisions in your state; and (2) within and 
beyond the states that make this authority explicit,133 effectuate 
uniform movement for more expeditious completion of IDEA 
DPHs.134 
                                                          
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: IMPROVED 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES COULD ENHANCE OVERSIGHT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
26 (Aug. 2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665434.pdf (recommending more 
clear and complete monitoring data concerning the timeliness of DPHs). 
131 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 10, at 522: This reform could be achieved by 
discouraging elaborate motion practice, holding prehearing conferences to clarify 
the dispute, and seizing every opportunity to minimize procedure while still 
affording ample opportunity to be heard. 
132 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: A 
Follow-Up Analysis, 303 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014) (focusing on the most recent 
available period, 2006–2011). 
133 See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
134 Judicial and agency authority generally is supportive of HO actions for 
more efficient DPHs.  E.g., Paris Sch. Dist. v. Harter, 894 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2018) 
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For researchers, areas that merit follow-up systematic study 
include (1) more in-depth coverage within the scope of this analysis 
to address the designated exclusions135 and the only incidentally 
identified subcategories136 and (2) extending the analysis to the state 
law provisions the HO’s decisional stage.137  Moreover, the related 
non-binding documents, such as internal manuals,138 and the 
prevailing practices and perceptions of IDEA HOs139 also represent 
gaps in the available empirical research. 
In conclusion, returning full circle to the IDEA’s model of 
cooperative federalism,140 both the legislation141 and other applicable 
                                                          
(upholding substantial reduction in parents’ attorney fees’ award based on part on 
taking 7 days for the hearing while the state law provided a general cap of 3 days); 
B.S. v. Anoka Hennepin Pub. Sch., 799 F.3d 1217 (8th Cir. 2015) (upholding 
prehearing order of nine hours per party based on circumstances of the case, 
including state law and best-practices manual); T.M. v. District of Columbia, 75 F. 
Supp. 3d 233 (D.D.C. 2014) (viewing limitation on cross-examination as 
reasonable in the context of hearing specified in prehearing order as maximum of 
four days); see also Letter to Kane, 65 IDELR ¶ 20 (OSEP 2015) (concluding that 
a state best-practice guideline limiting a hearing to three sessions of six hours per 
session does not violate the IDEA just as long as it allows the HO to make an 
exception).  Yet, although the average length of DPHs from filing to decision is not 
nationally available, the data that the U.S. Department of Education collects 
annually shows that the vast majority of HO decisions were not within the 45-day 
timeline.  E-mail from Diana Cruz, Data Analyst, National Center for Appropriate 
Dispute Resolution in Special Education, to Perry A. Zirkel (Dec. 21, 2017 9:40 
EST) (67% in 2004-05, 78% in 2005-06, 76% in 2006-07, 73% in 2007-08, 76% in 
2008-09, 71% in 2009-10, 76% in 2010-11, 79% in 2011-12, 80% in 2012-13, 82% 
in 2013-14, 74% in 2014-15, 74% in 2015-16). 
135 See supra note 64. 
136 See supra note 113. 
137 See supra note 33. 
138 See supra note 57. 
139 The right to lay representation at an IDEA DPH serves as a partial example 
of the difference between law and practice, with the broad notion of policy as an 
intermediate category.  Specifically, in contrast with the finding that seven state 
laws provide the right to lay representation (supra text accompanying note 86), a 
survey of SEA representatives approximately a decade ago found that twenty states 
either permitted (n=12) or left to the HO’s discretion (n=8) lay representation as a 
matter of policy and another twenty-one states had no official or unofficial policy 
in this matter.  Perry A. Zirkel, Lay Advocates and Parent Experts under the IDEA, 
217 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 21 (2007). 
140 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
141 E.g., see supra note 49. 
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authority142 reserve various HO issues to state law.  This systematic 
synthesis provides for HOs and other interested individuals gap-
filling information for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of 
this key dispute resolution process within and across the fifty states. 
 
 
VI.  APPENDIX CITATIONS FOR THE STATE LAWS SPECIFIC TO DPHS 
 
 
 Special Education Laws General Administrative 
Hearing Laws 
AL ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-8-9-
.08(9)(c) (2013) 
 
AK ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193 (2017); 
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, §§ 
52.550, 52.560 (2018) 
 
AZ* ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-766(F) 
(2017); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R7-2-
401 (2018) 
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE §§ R2-19-
101 et seq. (2017) 
AR ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-41-216 
(2017); ARK. ADMIN CODE R. § 
005.18.10-10.01 (2010) 
 
CA* CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56505-56509 
(West 2017); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
5, §§ 3080-3099 (2018) 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 1, §§ 1000 
et seq. (2018) 
CO* COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8(7.5)(f) 
(2016) 
COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 104-1, 
104-2 (2014) 
CT CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76h(c) 
(2017); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 
10-76h-7 to 10-76h-18 (2018) 
 
DE DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3130 
(2017); 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 
926(11) (2017) – 926(12) (2011) 
 
FL* FLA. STAT. § 1003.57(1)(c) (2017); 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 6A-
6.03311(9)(v) (2018) 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE rr. 28-
106.106 to 28-106.217 (2018) 
GA*  GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-4- GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 616-1-
                                                          
142 E.g., 71 Fed. Reg. 46,705 (Aug. 14, 2006) (agency commentary clarifying 
that the general supervisory responsibility of each SEA includes ensuring that its 
HOs are sufficiently trained to meet these newly specified qualifications); 
Questions and Answers on Procedural Safeguards and Due Process Procedures for 
Parents and Children with Disabilities, 61 IDELR ¶ 232, at item C-7 (OSEP 2013) 
(permitting state laws for electronic filing of DPH complaints). 
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7.12(3)(i) to 160-4-7.12(3)(t) 
(2018) 
2.01 et seq. (2018) 
HI* HAW. CODE R. §§ 80-60-65 to 80-
60-69 (2017) 
HAW. CODE R. §§ 16-201-15 to 
16-201-25 (2018) 
ID* IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 
08.02.03.004, ch. 13, §§ 5(D) – 5(F) 
(2018); Special Education Manual, 
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION (Aug. 10, 2017), 
http://www.sde.idaho.gov/topics/ad
min-rules/files/sped-
manual/documents/Special-
Education-Manual-Approved-
081017.pdf . 
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE rr. 
04.11.01.417 – 04.11.01.600 
(2018) 
IL 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 14-8.02a 
to d (2018); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
23, §§ 226.630 – 226.640 (2018) 
 
IN 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-45-7, 7-
45-8 (2018) 
4 IND. ADMIN. CODE rr. 21.5-3-
1 to 21.5-3-37 (2011) 
IA* IOWA ADMIN. CODE rr. 281-41.511 
to 281-41.512, 281-41.1003 to 
281.41.1013 (2018) 
IOWA ADMIN. CODE rr. 481-
10.13 – 481-10.23 (2018) 
KS* KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 91-40-28 to 
91-40-29 (2017) 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-522 
and 72-972a – 72-975 (2017) 
KY* KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.224 
(2017); 707 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 
1:340 (2018) 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
13B.030-130, 15.111 (2017) 
LA* LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, Pt. XLIII, 
§§ 511 – 512 (2017) 
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1, Pt. III, 
§§ 501 – 521 (2012) 
ME ME. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 7207-B 
(2017); 05-71-101 ME. CODE R. §§ 
XVI(7) to (14) (2017) 
 
MD* MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 8-413 
(West 2018); MD. CODE REGS. 
13A.05.02.06C and 13A.05.02.15C 
(2018) 
MD. CODE REGS. 28.02.01.05 – 
28.02.01.22 (2018) 
MA* MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71B, § 2A 
(2017); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 
28.08(5); Hearing Rules for Special 
Education Appeals, 
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF 
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY 
EDUCATION (Feb. 2008), 
www.mass.gov/anf/docs/dala/bsea/
hearing-rules.doc. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, §§ 
10 – 12 (2017); 801 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 1.01 et seq. (2018) 
MI* MICH. ADMIN. CODE rr. 340.1725e 
– 300.1724h (2018) 
MICH. ADMIN. CODE rr. 
792.10105 – 792.10121 (2015) 
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MN* MINN. STAT. § 125A.091 (2017); 
MINN. R. 3525.4010 to 4350 (2018) 
MINN. R. 1400.6500 to 7700 
(2018) 
MS MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-23-143 
(2017); 7-4 MISS. CODE R. §§ 
1.300.511 – 1.300.513 (2017) 
 
MO MO. REV. STAT. §§ 162.961 and 
621.253 (2018) 
 
MT MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3509-23 
(2015) 
 
NE NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1164 – 79-
1167 (2017); 92 NEB. ADMIN. 
CODE §§ 55-002 – 55-007 (2017) 
 
NV NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 388.463 – 
388.469 (2017); NEV. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 388.310 (2017) 
 
NH N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 186-
C:16-a,16-b (2016); N.H. CODE R. 
EDUC. 1123.01(LexisNexis 2017) 
 
NJ* N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-2.7 
(2018) 
N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1:6A-1.1 
et seq., 1:1-5.4 et. seq. (2018) 
NM N.M. CODE R. §§ 6.31.2.12(I)(12)-
(18) (LexisNexis 2017) 
 
NY N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404 
(LexisNexis 2018); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(j) 
(2018) 
 
NC* N.C. GEN. STAT. §115C-109.6 
(2017) 
26 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 3.0105-
0122 (2017) 
ND* N.D. ADMIN. CODE 67-23-05-01 – 
67-23-05-03 (2018) 
N.D.  ADMIN. CODE 98-02-02, 
98-02-03 (2012) 
OH OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-
05(K)(8)-(K)(12) (2014) 
 
OK OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:15-13-5 
– 210:15-13-6 (2008) 
 
OR* OR. REV. STAT. § 343.165 (2017); 
OR. ADMIN. R. 581-015-2340 – 
581-015-2383 (2017) 
OR. ADMIN. R. 137-003-0501 et 
seq. (2017) 
PA 4 PA. CODE § 14.162 (2017)  
RI R.I. CODE R. § 21-2-54:E (2017)  
SC S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-243 
(2016); Policies and Procedures in 
accordance with the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act, 2004, SOUTH 
CAROLINA STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION (Mar. 2011), 
https://ed.sc.gov/districts-
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schools/special-education-
services/fiscal-and-grants-
management-fgm/grants/sc-
policies-and-procedures-for-
special-education/. 
SD* S.D. ADMIN. R. 24:05:30:09.04 – 
24:05:30:13 (2017) 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-26-
18 – 1-26-26 (2017) 
TN* TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-606 
(2017); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 
0520-01-09-.18 (2017) 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-301 
(2017); TENN. COMP. R. & 
REGS. 1360-04-01-.01 et seq. 
(2017) 
TX 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1151 – 
89.1186 (2017) 
 
UT Special Education Rules, UTAH 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, (Oct. 
2016) 
https://www.schools.utah.gov/file/b
ff61848-ae42-4265-a654-
6dae5f398507. 
 
VT VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2957 
(2017); 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 5:2365 
(2017) 
 
VA* VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-214 – 22.1-
214.1 (2017); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 20-81-210 (2017) 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-4024 – 
2.2-4024.2 (2017); Hearing 
Officer System Rules of 
Administration, SUPREME COURT 
OF VIRGINIA (Jan. 1, 2017), 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/pro
grams/ho/rules_of_admin_1.pdf. 
WA* WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 392-
172A-05095 – 392-172A-05110 
(2017) 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10-08-
090 – 10-08-200 (2017) 
WV W. VA. CODE R. § 126-16-3 
(2017); Regulations for the 
Education of Students with 
Exceptionalities, WEST VIRGINIA 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (Aug. 
14, 2017), 
http://wvde.state.wv.us/osp/Policy2
419_2017.pdf. 
 
WI* WIS. STAT. § 115.80 (2017); WIS. 
ADMIN. CODE PI § 11.12 (2017) 
 
WY 7 WYO. CODE R. § 7 (2018); Special 
Education Policy and Procedure 
Manual, WYOMING DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION (Aug. 20, 2010), 
https://edu.wyoming.gov/download
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s/special-ed/SpecEd_Policy_and_ 
Procedure_Manual_v__1_1FINAL
_8-20-2010.pdf. 
*Designates states that have pertinent, more general laws (typically APA 
legislation and/or regulations) in addition to special education-specific laws 
 
